The ‘Coldplay Incident’: Work and Private Life – by Virginia Mantouvalou

Image by Okan Caliskan from Pixabay

1. Introduction

Last summer, a woman and a man were embracing blissfully at a Coldplay concert when they were caught by a ‘kiss cam’, a camera that is used in concerts to capture and show on a big screen people who are kissing during a performance. It is supposed to be an exciting moment. However, as soon as this couple saw themselves on the big screen, they panicked and covered their faces. Chris Martin, the singer of Coldplay, joked about their reaction: they are either very shy or have an affair, he said. Someone captured the ‘kiss cam’ moment and the singer’s comment in a video, and posted it on social media. The couple happened to also be colleagues, senior executives of a US company: the man was the Chief Executive Officer and the woman was Chief People Officer. As soon as the video was posted, and for days and weeks after that, they were publicly humiliated on social and mainstream media across the world for allegedly having an extramarital affair.

Later on it emerged that at least one of them had already been separated from her partner. Never mind – too late for the moral outrage on social media. As soon as the Coldplay incident occurred, both were suspended from work. Soon after that, they resigned.

Is it fair for people to lose their jobs because of activities involving their intimate life away from work? When is this permissible and under what criteria?  

A lot of social media users seem to have found the incident shocking because of the alleged extramarital affair, even though there was no illegal conduct involved. Fewer expressed concern for the public humiliation and dismissal of two employees. I will focus on the latter issue of dismissal in this blog post. In the US, where the incident occurred, there is very limited protection from dismissal as there is a regime of employment at-will (termination any time for any reason without notice), but here I focus on English law and European human rights.

In the age of social media, where privacy is ever increasingly restricted, it is important to clarify the boundaries of work and private life. To address the issue, I will present the legal framework and central case law to identify criteria that should guide the reasoning of courts and tribunals in instances when employees face disciplinary action for their life away from work.

2. Dismissal and private life

UK law protects from unfair dismissal through the Employment Rights Act 1996. The employer needs to give a reason for dismissal that has to involve conduct, capability or qualifications, redundancy or ‘some other substantial reason’. Section 98(4) contains a test: the reason that the employer gave for a dismissal must be ‘reasonable’. The problem with this test, as employment lawyers know all too well, is that it gives employers a great degree of discretion: dismissals that are very harsh are regularly deemed to be fair, because tribunals and courts do not want to interfere with managerial decisions (for an early account, see Hugh Collins, Justice in Dismissal and more recently see this piece by Aaron Baker). For this reason, employees enjoy very limited protection.

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), incorporated in UK law through the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), protects the right to private life in article 8, which can be central in such dismissals. Isn’t what we do away from work part of our private life?

Employees in the private sector cannot invoke ECHR rights directly against their employers but these rights can become indirectly relevant to the law of unfair dismissal. This is because according to section 3 of the HRA, courts have a duty to interpret primary and subordinate legislation in a way that is compatible with the incorporated rights, insofar as possible. In addition, section 6 of the HRA says that public authorities, including courts and tribunals, have to act in compliance with Convention rights. This also means that they should develop the common law in line with the ECHR.

Interestingly, one of the earliest authoritative cases on the relationship between human rights and unfair dismissal was exactly on the topic that concerns me here: activities in private life as a reason for dismissal.  This was X v Y, where the Court of Appeal had to examine the fairness of the dismissal of a man who was caught engaging in consensual sex with another man in the toilet of a café on a Saturday night in the middle of nowhere, and whose name was then included in the Sex Offenders Register for having sex in ‘public space’. The employer of Mr X, a charity working with young offenders, saw his name in the Register and dismissed him.

Mr X took his case to court, claiming that his dismissal violated his right to private life. Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR): ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence’. The Court of Appeal was prepared to accept that the right to be protected against unfair dismissal must be interpreted in line with the right to private life. In a much cited passage, Lord Justice Mummery said:

‘Some unfair dismissal cases naturally attract arguments based on Convention rights and the HRA: the employee dismissed for refusing, on religious grounds, to work on a particular day (article 9); the employee dismissed for engaging in party politics (article 10); or the employee whose activities, even in the privacy of his own home, may constitute a criminal offence and lead to dismissal (article 8). In general, whenever HRA points are raised in unfair dismissal cases, the employment tribunals should properly consider their relevance, dealing with them in a structured way (though not necessarily at great length), even if it is ultimately decided that they do not affect the outcome of the claim for unfair dismissal.’

However, he then found that article 8 was not engaged in this case because the activity of Mr X was in public space (in the toilet of a café). People do not have an expectation of privacy in public space on this view, and hence they enjoy no protection of their right to private life. But should the scope of private life be determined by reference to the location of an activity?

The spatial criterion as a factor that determines the scope of private life is incorrect if we look at the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The ECtHR has decided on several occasions that Article 8 is applicable to activities in public space (Von Hannover v Germany; Pay v UK). It is also morally problematic if we consider the underlying values of privacy (which I considered in this article in the Modern Law Review in 2008). It is unfortunate that a spatial understanding of the right to privacy has been endorsed in more recent tribunal decisions, such as Lawrence v Secretary of State for Justice which involved the dismissal of a civil servant posting erotic images of herself online (but see Jeffreys v Stagecoach South East where the tribunal accepted that activities in public space are covered by the right to private life).

Generally speaking, in assessing whether article 8 is applicable, the ECtHR considers whether there is a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’. What we observe in recent years is that this test has become an objective test, as we explained in the book Human Rights at Work, which does not only depend on what the employer dictates in the contract or rulebook (see Bărbulescu v Romania, noted by Joe Atkinson). In this case, the Court said that private social life, even within the workplace, cannot be ‘reduced to zero’.

The couple at the Coldplay concert were in a public space: they did not act in seclusion. Not only were they in a public space, but their image was also disseminated as broadly and publicly as it gets through social and mainstream media. However, the spatial criterion is not crucial in deciding if an activity is part of someone’s private life for the purposes of their employment. If someone is dismissed for this reason in the UK, the dismissal interferes with their right to private life. This principle should obviously apply particularly strongly when looking at activities outside the workplace and working time. An interference with the right to private life does not mean that there is a violation of article 8. It means that we need to apply a test of proportionality (rather than a test of reasonableness that we have in the Employment Rights Act 1996) to see if there is a violation.

3. Can private activities ever justify dismissal?

Article 8(2) of the ECHR permits restrictions subject to a test of proportionality:

‘There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.

The test of proportionality requires the employer to point to a legitimate aim, such as the protection of its business interests, and show that the detriment such as dismissal was imposed in accordance with the law.  The final part of the test of proportionality follows the guidance of Lord Reed in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2):

1. Whether the objective of the measure is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a protected right;
2. Whether the measure is rationally connected to the objective;
3. Whether a less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromising the achievement of the objective; and
4. Whether, balancing the severity of the measure’s effects on the rights of the persons to whom it applies against the importance of the objective, to the extent that the measure will contribute to its achievement, the former outweighs the latter (para 74).

It is important to appreciate that the test of proportionality is stricter than the test of reasonableness in the law of unfair dismissal. The employer needs to show that it has a legitimate aim, and that the disciplinary action is strictly required in pursuing this aim – I discussed this in more detail here). This test is appropriate for disciplinary action and particularly for dismissal that may violate human rights, given the fundamental importance of human rights and the detrimental implications that such disciplinary action can have on people’s lives (see this piece by Hugh Collins).

4. Criteria

What criteria are relevant in applying the test of proportionality in cases where people lose their jobs for reasons involving their private life? We can draw on domestic and ECHR case law to identify these. In Higgs v Farmor’s School, a case involving anti-discrimination law and freedom of expression, the Court of Appeal accepted that the relevant considerations for the test of proportionality include: the content and tone of speech, its extent and the worker’s understanding of the likely audience, the effects on the rights of others and the ability of the employer to run its business, whether the worker was clear that the views expressed were personal, any potential power imbalance between the worker and those affected by the speech, the nature of the employer’s business, and whether the measure taken by the employer is the least intrusive one.

In relation to dismissal that interferes with the right to private life, the nature of the activity away from work is relevant, and so is the nature of the employer’s business and the nature of the employee’s job. How these criteria should be used can be illustrated by the cases Obst and Schuth of the ECtHR. These involved dismissal by organisations that promote a particular ideology or ethic, also known as ‘ideological organisations’, and illustrate the Court’s main considerations when applying the test of proportionality in dismissal for reasons involving people’s private life.

The employers in these two cases, religious organisations, dismissed the applicants because they both had extramarital affairs. Generally speaking, and contrary to what we saw in the Coldplay incident, one would think that whether someone has an extramarital affair is none of the employer’s business. However, when considering employees of organisations committed to a particular ethic, things may be different. Mr Obst was employed as director for Europe of public relations by the Mormon Church, and Mr Schuth was employed as an organist and choirmaster by the Catholic Church. The Court applied a test of proportionality in both cases and reached different outcomes on each application. It emphasized that

‘[w]hilst it is true that, under the Convention, an employer whose ethos is based on religion or on a philosophical belief may impose specific duties of loyalty on its employees, a decision to dismiss based on a breach of such duty cannot be subjected, on the basis of the employer’s right of autonomy, only to a limited judicial scrutiny exercised by the relevant domestic employment tribunal without having regard to the nature of the post in question and without properly balancing the interests involved in accordance with the principle of proportionality.’

The post that someone has in the organisation is a consideration to be taken into account when assessing the fairness of dismissal, and the dismissal of Mr Obst was ruled to be compatible with the Convention. He had been raised as a member of the Mormon Church, and was aware that his conduct would be contrary to its beliefs, which he represented, as he was responsible for its public relations. According to the Court, by signing his contract with the Mormon Church, he knew that he agreed to marital fidelity that was a central issue for this Church.

The same could not be said about Mr Schuth, in the view of the Court. His job as an organist and choirmaster was not so closely connected to the Catholic Church’s mission, and during his years of employment he never argued against the Church’s beliefs, which means that he did not publicise his views that were different to the beliefs of the Church. His contract did not imply that he agreed to marital fidelity, and his affair had not been publicised in a way that could harm the Church’s image. At the same time, the fact that Mr Schuth would face great difficulty in obtaining a job with another employer because of the nature of his work was an additional weighty consideration, particularly when the employer has a ‘predominant position in a given sector or activity’ (para 73). The dismissal of Mr Schuth was ruled to violate his right to private life.

The above cases show that in ideological organisations where the employee may have certain duties to comply with a particular ethic, a test of proportionality is crucial when it comes to activities in the employee’s private life. Factors that the Court considered in applying the test of proportionality include the question whether the employer’s sanction involves the deprivation of a job, livelihood, and possibly a career. These factors interpret private life in a manner that is sensitive to the employment context and the importance of work (as the main means by which most people make a living) and private life, which is where many people develop their most intimate interpersonal relations.

How about criminal offences? As far as we know and despite the outcry on social media, the Coldplay incident did not involve any crime (while the case X v Y, mentioned earlier involved a criminal offence). In any case, as the ECtHR said more than two decades ago, criminal offences can be relevant to obtaining (or retaining) a job only if a person’s post is directly relevant to the offence committed. We saw this principle in the case Thlimmenos v Greece.  Mr Thlimmenos had been convicted under Greek legislation for refusing to wear a military uniform for the purposes of his mandatory military service because of his religious beliefs. As a result, he was not permitted to work as a chartered accountant. The ECtHR said that the criminal offence of Mr Thlimmenos had nothing to do with the position of an accountant, and that the refusal to hire him for this reason violated his Convention rights.

Some may ask: is it right to impose on employers the same standards used to hold state authorities into account? The answer is positive and firmly so. Dismissal is the harshest form of disciplinary action: it leads to loss of income, loss of livelihood, and possible inability to have a career. It has effects on people’s reputation, and particularly so when private conduct attracts attention on social media, as we saw in the Coldplay incident among many other examples. The effect of a dismissal on the worker’s reputation is another criterion to take into account (see Denisov v Ukraine). If we don’t set clear limits to the employers’ power, we risk having a Private Government, in the words of Elizabeth Anderson, where employers take arbitrary decisions and rule employees’ lives with no accountability.

5. Employer’s reputation

When looking at the supposed effects of activities away from work on the employer’s reputation, very close scrutiny is required because these effects may sometimes be due to societal prejudice and majoritarian preferences that are contrary to individual autonomy. The purpose of human rights law is exactly to protect individuals and minoritised groups from prejudice and oppression. Concerns voiced by employers that the sex life of their employees (or other aspects of private life) might adversely affect business reputation should be tested with real caution because of the importance of privacy and sexual intimacy for dignity and autonomy. Dismissal for private activities that may damage reputation because they are viewed by some (or even by many) as immoral is problematic. Strong protection of private life can eliminate the possibility of indirect imposition of moralistic preferences of either the employer or the wider public on employees.

Societal prejudice on sex-related matters has historically been widespread, and has frequently led to injustice, as was exemplified in Smith and Grady v UK: the applicants were discharged from the armed forces because of their sexual orientation. In examining their complaint, the ECtHR stressed that their discharge stemmed primarily from a ‘predisposed bias on the part of the heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority’ (para 97) rather than evidence that they could not perform their job. The Court concluded that the UK violated the ECHR. The prejudicial and disgraceful treatment of people under this ban on the basis of their sexual orientation is still topical today.

It should also be added that the employer’s reputation as a justification for dismissal should be approached with particular caution because it may constitute a pretext (as we saw in the case Mason v Huddersfield Giants), it may disguise an employer’s moralistic views about how employees should lead their lives (Smith and Grady), or it may lead to the imposition of majority views (through pressure from the tabloid press, for instance, as we saw in Gibbins v British Council) on individuals, minoritised groups and others.

6. Would clear employer guidelines help?

Sometimes people say that all employers need on such occasions are clear guidelines in the contract of employment or employer rulebook defining conduct that is acceptable and conduct that is not acceptable. In this line of thinking, organisations may decide to define their ethos and required behaviour by their employees in strongly ‘moral’ terms. This could lead employers to issue strong ethical behaviour statements which encroach on private life. However, this approach would be wrong when considering employer interference with human rights law and courts should approach the question of the character of an organisation and its moral in objective terms looking at the nature of the organisation, rather than on the basis of what the contract or rulebook say. We need to take great care before we accept that Convention rights can be restricted by contract, as Gillian Morris wrote soon after the enactment of the HRA.

Individuals in most jobs should not be viewed as brand ambassadors in their private life. The employer has very little justification to interfere with individual autonomy away from work, while the inequality of power at work is such that the employee typically accepts employers’ terms and conditions without having the power to challenge them. This is why the ECtHR said forcefully in Barbulescu that private life at work cannot be reduced to zero by the employer’s restrictive regulations (para 80).

7. Conclusion

It is easy to forget that people have a right to private life in today’s world of social media, an issue addressed in the first piece published on this blog. However, the right to private life in human rights law, together with the law of unfair dismissal, can be valuable tools to protect employees from employers’ arbitrary decisions and imposition of majoritarian preferences on how people should be living their lives away from work. Some may think that workers are ambassadors of the employer in their private lives and that the employers can prescribe employees’ off-duty conduct. This is oppressive and contrary to individual autonomy. Employers are not custodians of employees’ moral character and employees should not be required to live their lives in line with managers’ personal views and preferences. We need to draw a sharp line separating life at work and life away from work. Courts and tribunals have the legal tools to protect workers’ private life on the basis of UK law and it essential that they do so for otherwise there is a great risk of oppression and employer domination.

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This is based on a lecture I gave to the Industrial Law Society in October 2025.

About the author

(Suggested citation: V Mantouvalou, The ‘Coldplay Incident’: Work and Private Life, UK Labour Law Blog, 5 November 2025 available at https://uklabourlawblog.com/)